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Case No. 950568-CA 
Priority No. 2 
By this appeal, Appellant Michael Yoder ("Yoder") is seeking 
a fair and just trial. The federal and state constitutions forbid 
officers from conducting warrantless searches based on hunches 
and gut instinct, and from strong-arming citizens into consent. 
Since specific evidence against Yoder was illegally obtained, it 
should be suppressed pursuant to an order from this Court rever-
sing the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress and 
remanding the case for further disposition consistent therewith. 
POINT I. THE STATE#S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH IGNORE IMPORTANT FACTS AND MISREPRESENT THE LAW, 
The state has dedicated three Points in the Argument to the 
warrantless search issue. (Brief of Appellee ("Br.App.") 15-44.) 
Each point assumes to capture the spirit of this Court's review 
by establishing the officers' actions should not be considered in 
a vacuum, but must be viewed in context with the "totality of the 
circumstances." (Br.App. 17-18; 23-24; 29.) "Totality of the cir-
cumstances" concerns such matters as the officer's conduct, the 
number of officers present, and the duration, location, and time 
of events leading up to the search. See U.S. v. Lattimore, 87 
F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996). In this case, a review of those 
1 
matters discredits the state's claim that the search was valid. 
A. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ASSERTIONS, THE ALLEGED CONSENT 
WAS A PRODUCT OF HARASSMENT AND DURESS. 
1. The Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis Concerns the 
Facts and Prevailing Mood Prior to the Search. 
The state concedes it is required to prove consent has been 
voluntarily and freely given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied. (Br.App. 16-23.)1 In this case, the state downplayed 
the "duress and coercion" that preceded the search. (See Id.) 
It claims that during Yoder's lengthy encounter with 
officers just inside the front door of his apartment, the mood at 
times was cooperative and "invit[ing]," officers were deferential 
1
 The state claims that in determining the voluntariness of consent 
the "[court's indulgence in] every reasonable presumption against wavier 
of fundamental constitutional rights" as articulated in State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (UtahApp.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 
(Utah 1990), is not part of the inquiry. (Br.App. n. 8.) In support of 
that proposition, the state cites to State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1263 (Utah 1993). The Thurman court did not disavow the well-established 
principle that the fourth amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches 
and seizures, and that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable." 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Nor did the Thurman court reject the 
proposition that the burden is on the state to prove the search falls 
within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement under the 
constitution. See e.g. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984); 
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 
715, 717-18 (Utah 1983) ; State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 178 (Utah 1983) ; 
State v. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478, 482 (Utah 1981). Indeed, the factors 
identified in Yoder's opening brief (Brief of Appellant at 32) must be 
applied to determine the validity of the consent. 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and voluntarily given"; (2) 
the government must prove consent was given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d at 887-888 (quoting. United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)); U.S. v. Muldrow, 19 F.3d 1332, 1336 (10th 
Cir.) cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 175 (1994) (court indulges every reasonable 
presumption against waiver of a constitutional right). 
2 
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2
 Closer examination of the state's accusation suggests the state 
meant to say Yoder did not set forth "what didn't happen." For example, 
the officers "didn't" display their guns. (Br.App. 21.) 
3 
he "would do so" (Br.App. 18-19; R. 477; 519);3 officers "begged 
and pleaded" for consent to search Yoder's premises and explained 
"over and over" the reasons for wanting to conduct the search 
(Br.App. 19; 21; 22); and Yoder repeatedly "resist[ed] their 
ardent, forthright requests" (Br.App. 22). 
The officers' requests for 45 minutes in the face of Yoder7s 
resistance were sufficient to poison the fruits of the search. 
Yet there was more. The state omitted the fact that Yoder called 
911 and reported officers trespassing in his home. The dispatcher 
refused to help and suggested Yoder cooperate. (R. 653-55.) Also, 
Yoder told officers he wanted to talk to his attorney. (Id.) 
In examining the surrounding circumstances to determine 
3
 Such representations reflect confidence and arrogance in Calls' 
abilities -- his message to Yoder was that he could lawfully search the 
premises with or without consent. Those clear expressions constitute 
coercive tactics particularly when coupled with other factors, including 
the officers' unrelenting requests to search in the face of Yoder's 
refusal to cooperate. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549 
(1968); (see Brief of Appellant at 22-27.) 
Any intimation that the warrant will automatically be issued should 
be considered as coercive as the announcement of an invalid warrant 
in Bumper. Drawing the line at this point admittedly makes validity 
of consent turn in some instances on subtle shifts of wording by the 
agent. But words spoken in the process of obtaining consent to 
waiver of a constitutional right ought to be chosen with care. The 
officers are not proceeding in haste to make a split-second decision 
of their authority to apprehend a fleeing suspect. They face a 
situation that normally calls for the delay necessary to obtain a 
search warrant. If they are to forego this requirement, it should 
not be too much to ask that they take care not to confront the 
accused with a choice that totally obliterates the important 
protective function of the warrant-issuing process. 
U.S. v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 497 (2d Cir. 1974) (Newman, J. 
concurring); State v. Allenf 612 P.2d 199, 204-05 (Mont. 1980) (tenant's 
consent to search apartment invalid in face of officer's threat that 
consent was not necessary -- "fraudulent show of authority"). 
The state retreated from its characterization of Call's dealings 
with Yoder and attempted to dilute the confidence Call expressed in his 
abilities to obtain the warrant by asserting that Call merely told Yoder 
he would "seek" the issuance of a warrant. (Br.App. 18-19.) The state 
has distorted Call's testimony to bolster its argument. 
4 
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the officers have nor gotten the 'right 1 a:v/wer yet; frorr: H - U S -
pect v ~i ' U U their requests • - : ± continue unt : " * u-^  susr>e^t 
gives cne response they seek. ^tate v. Bobo, t 
r Utah App ; 9--<: 
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relative egregiousness of the misconduct against the time 
and circumstances that intervene before the consent is 
given. The nature and degree of the illegality will usually 
be inversely related to the effectiveness of time and 
intervening events to dissipate the presumed taint. Where 
the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean break in 
the chain of events between the misconduct and the consent 
to find the consent valid. For example, Justice Powell :^ 
Brown suggested that, where it appears from the facts • z 
the police purposely engaged in conduct to induce a 
confession, an intervening consultation with counsel or 
presentation before a magistrate may be required before the 
taint can be removed. 422 U.S. at 611, 35 S.Ct. at 2265-66 
(Powell, J., concurring). The same type of break should be 
required where the evidence shows that t- h<=> po] i ce pi irposel y 
engaged in conduct to induce a consem 
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5 
coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to 
refuse." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991). 
In addition, to be valid the consent may not be an 
exploitation of a prior illegality, i.e. trespass and/or 
illegally detaining and seizing Yoder for a period of between 2 0 
minutes and an hour.4 After officers made their initial check -
- as instructed by Officer William McCarthy ("McCarthy") -- and 
determined Yoder appeared nervous and intoxicated (R. 333; 349-
50; 603-04; 613-14; 635), they unlawfully remained on the pre-
4
 The state claims Yoder waived his argument on appeal concerning 
the illegality of the officers on the premises. (Br.App. 38-39.) 
However, the record reflects Yoder argued the officers were not lawfully 
on the premises. (R. 677; 681-83; 54-55; 127-28.) 
Whether the illegality arose as a trespass or an impermissible 
expansion of the scope of their original activities is inconsequential. 
The result is the same: There was no proof of an unequivocal break in the 
chain of illegality sufficient to dissipate the taint of the officers' 
actions. U.S. v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236, 243 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 419 
U.S. 1048 (1974) (although defendant did not withhold consent officers 
improperly obtained it in exploitation of prior illegal conduct); U.S. 
v. Babwah, 972 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1992) (illegal arrest tainted 
consent, as "the whole purpose of extending [defendant's] custody seems 
to have been the hope of obtaining his consent") ; State v. Rushton, 870 
P. 2d 1355, 1361-62 (Mont. 1994) (consent involuntary where, among other 
things, officers implied they could detain defendant in his home for 
unreasonable period of time while warrant was being obtained). 
The officers were required to "'diligently [pursue] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant.'" 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). In 
this matter they failed in that task. The unlawful conduct and unreason-
able detention were tantamount to trespass and an arrest unsupported by 
probable cause. In the alternative, they constituted an unconstitutional 
seizure unsupported by reasonable suspicion. See Florida v. Rover, 460 
U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983) (reasonable suspicion of crime is insufficient 
to justify custodial interrogation even though it is investigative); 
United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 914 (1981) (although of ficers' reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity justified brief inquiry, the 20-minute detention was 
improper absent probable cause); State v. Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1322 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) (unless 
defendant is parolee, absent consent or exigency plus probable cause, 
arrest warrant is required before defendant can be arrested in his home) . 
6 
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b
 The state relies on Bobo, 803 r.~u _ _._ _ . to support the 
assertion that Yoder's alleged consent was "voluntary." In Bobo, this 
Court rejected as misleading the officer's representation that a warrant 
would inevitably be issued since "[n]o tricks were employed by the law 
enforcement [officers. When] they said they were getting a warrant they 
were in the process of getting a warrant [through the efforts of] the 
county attorney." Id. at 1273. Also, as the state recognized in Bobo, 
"no magistrate would have difficulty in finding probable cause." 
(Br.App. 21.) After all, officers were invited into defendant's home and 
"saw a pipe in plain view on a counter" that smelled of marijuana. 
Defendant was placed under arrest. When he was searched incident to the 
arrest, a small vial containing a white substance was found." Id. at 
1270. Finally, the defendant never refused consent to search, 
[H] e had simply not said they could search. The detective repeated 
his request [to search] , telling the defendant that his consent 
(continued...) 
7 
the illegal conduct and the alleged "consent," the consent was 
illegally obtained and the fruits of the search were poisoned. 
Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
2. A Reasonable Person Would Have Understood the Limits of 
the Search to Be as Described in Plain English by Eyre. 
Under the analysis identified by the state the scope of the 
search is what "the typical reasonable person" would have 
understood it to be. (Br.App. 23-24.) In this case, the scope 
of the search was defined by Salt Lake County Deputy Kenneth Eyre 
("Eyre"), who conducted the search. Yoder did not testify. Thus, 
the trial court was not required to wade through conflicts in 
testimony or differing interpretations. Either the trial court 
believed Eyre's testimony and the search was limited in scope, or 
it did not believe his testimony and there is no evidence of the 
alleged consent. (See Brief of Appellant at 12.) 
Eyre testified the search would be conducted under the 
following conditions: 
(Eyre) A. I wanted to make it clear to him that it would 
iust be himself and J, that we would be the only ones, and I 
said, you know, Mike, I says, how about if iust you and I 
search the balcony. I said, the West Valley officers won't 
have anything to do with it. They'll stay here. Just you 
and me, let's iust you and me go out and look. 
Q. Is that what happened? 
b
 (. ..continued) 
would expedite the process. Defendant then told the detective that 
he wished to get it over with, and that the officers could search. 
Id. The state's reliance on Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 
S.Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) , is perplexing since that case did not deal with 
consent to conduct a warrantless search. (Br.App. 21.) In Mincev, a case 
concerning the murder of a police officer, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the state's argument that the warrantless search of the 
homicide scene (the suspect's apartment) was valid under any recognized 
exception. Id. 437 U.S. at 390. 
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warrants.6 The suggestion that a warrantless search is 
unlimited except insofar as the object of the search is defined, 
has no basis in the law. See Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proc. 
§ SS 240.3 (1975) (providing that consent searches can be limited 
in duration or physical scope). An "officer has no more right to 
make a search beyond the limits prescribed in a consent to 
search, then he has to exceed the limit prescribed in a search 
warrant." People v. Schmoll. 48 N.E.2d 933, 934 (111. 1943). 
Finally, the state recognized that a suspect may revoke 
consent to search, and asserts revocation must be "clear and 
unequivocal." (Br.App. 25.) By Yoder's conduct in opening and 
shutting the balcony closet and saying, "See, there's nothing out 
here" (R. 623), he demonstrated clear revocation of alleged 
consent. He did not "demonstrate[]" that the closet was "within 
the scope of the search" as claimed by the state. (Br.App. 25.)7 
Eyre understood that Yoder still refused to give consent with 
comments like: "I don't have anything here. There's -- you're not 
6
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-201 (1995) (things, place and person 
to be searched must be described with particularity in issued warrant); 
77-23-203 (1995) (magistrate is required to place conditions on search 
in certain instances); 77-23-205 (1995) (time to be specified). 
7
 The state relies on United States v. Stoecker, 13 M.J. 879, 881 
(ACMR 1982) , in support of the proposition that by going to the balcony 
closet and opening and closing the door, Yoder "demonstrated that he 
believed the closet to be within the scope of the search." (Br.App. at 
25: state asserts that according to Stoecker, "voluntarily passing down 
boxes for examination showed expectation that containers would be 
inspected.") Review of the Stoecker case reflects it is inapposite. In 
addition, the state failed to disclose the subsequent history of the 
Stoecker case. After the United States Army Court of Military Review 
denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence in Stoecker, 13 M.J. 
at 879, the United States Court of Military Appeals reversed and remanded 
the lower court's ruling, and dismissed the charge for lack of evidence. 
United States v. Stoecker, 17 M.J. 158 (USCMA 1984) . 
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going to find anything here, those kinds of comments." (R. 332-
35; 622.) Eyre felt "between" him and Yoder consent was actually 
given only when Yoder "immediately without any hesitation said, 
okay, and he went back to walk in front of me towards the 
balcony, went out on the balcony first. I followed after him." 
(Id.) Thus, Eyre must have understood Yoder's comment "there's 
nothing out here," to trigger revocation. 
Likewise, reasonable people understand the expression 
"there's nothing out here" to mean there is no need to continue 
with a particular line of inquiry or review. Such an expression 
is distinguishable from comments and actions of suspects in cases 
cited by the state. See U.S. v. Alfaro, 935 F.2d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 
1991) (the statement, "I have to go outside to talk" is not 
revocation); Burton v. U.S., 657 A.2d 741, 748 (D.C. App. 1994) 
(placing hand in pocket is not revocation). No other possible 
explanation or meaning but revocation exists for Yoder's conduct. 
See Burton, 657 A.2d at 748 ("objective reasonableness" test was 
not passed where other explanations for conduct existed). 
B. THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION IS INAPPLICABLE: 
OFFICERS' FAILURE TO SEARCH UNTIL THEY HAD ALLEGED CONSENT 
REFLECTS THEY KNEW THEY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The state claims the following supports probable cause: 
(1) Shalee's clothes were found in an area previously 
searched and to which was [sic] defendant's building was 
closest, (2) defendant was seen on the balcony above the 
site of the clothing watching the gathering crowd below, (3) 
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during the officer's [sic] lengthy discussion explaining 
their purpose in being there, their concern for Shalee and 
their request to search, defendant perspired profusely, 
appeared extremely nervous and refused to cooperate so that 
Officer Call concluded that defendant had something to hide 
about Shalee's disappearance and (4) "given the nature of 
the officer's urgent plea and all of the circumstances, 
Officer Call concluded that a reasonable individual would 
say: 'Certainly, please look;' so that the officers could 
get on to the next apartment in their search." 
(Br.App. 2 9.) Factors (1) and (2) only place Yoder in the 
apartment complex vicinity, together with numerous other people 
both on the grounds and in the buildings, at the time the 
clothing was discovered. Nothing in the record suggests that 
when officers went up to Yoder's apartment, they had any reason 
to suspect he was involved in Shalee's disappearance.8 
Factors (3) and (4), Yoder sweating and appearing nervous 
and Yoder's refusal to consent to a search of his premises, are 
consistent with intoxication and an apparent lack of interest in 
the situation. Such factors do not give rise to probable cause. 
An officer testified that numerous people are nervous when 
talking with police (R. 603-04; 613-14). 
The officers in this case "concluded that defendant had 
Even after officers could reflect on the relevance of events that 
evening, they did not testify that they linked the appearance of clothing 
to Yoder or his apartment. Call testified the clothing was found closest 
to Building K, which housed numerous apartments and tenants, including 
Yoder (R. 513; 550) . McCarthy testified there were no apartments directly 
above or below where the clothing was found. (R. 560.) When McCarthy 
directed other officers to check whether Yoder had seen anything, he did 
not believe the clothing had been thrown from an apartment in Building 
K. (R. 560.) Eyre did not link the clothes to the apartment building. 
(R. 362-64; 623-24.) Officers were concerned that the abductor may be in 
the crowd or in one of the apartment complexes. (R. 435-37, 490-91.) 
Numerous explanations for the appearance of the clothing existed. (See 
Brief of Appellant at n. 2.) Officers had no reason to suspect Yoder of 
criminal conduct when the clothes were found. 
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something to hide about Shalee's disappearance" based on hunches 
and instincts. (Br.App. 29-31.) According to the state, it was 
Yoder's "patent refusal to assist police in their mission" that 
triggered officers7 suspicions and alleged "reasonable belief" 
that he was connected to Shalee's disappearance. (Id.) 
"[I]n order for probable cause to search to exist, the 
officer must have reasonable trustworthy information of 
supporting facts and circumstances such as would persuade a 
person of reasonable caution to believe the search is justified." 
U.S. v. Infante-Ruiz, 13 F.3d 498, 502 (1st Cir. 1994). "[I]n 
the absence of supporting facts, the officer's suspicion or 
personal belief that probable cause exists is not enough." There 
must be particular facts indicting that the area to be searched 
contains evidence of crime or some other seizable matter. Id. 
In State v. Hewitt, 841 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Utah App. 1992), 
the state acknowledged that in light of State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 436 (Utah App. 1990), State v. Lovecrren, 829 P.2d 155, 
158 (Utah App. 1992), and State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654 
(Utah App. 1992), nervous behavior is insufficient to give rise 
to reasonable articulable suspicion to detain an individual. This 
Court agreed. Hewitt, 841 P.2d at 1224 (Russon, J.); see also 
Mova v. U.S., 761 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1984) (it is reasonable 
to expect one to feel stress when questioned by police). If 
nervousness does not support reasonable suspicion, it cannot be 
sufficient to support probable cause. As Chief Justice Zimmerman 
stated, "I find ludicrous the State's argument that because these 
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individuals appeared to have been unsettled by the officers' 
extraordinary conduct, the officers had justification for sus-
pecting that something improper was going on." State v. Mendoza. 
748 P.2d 181, 187 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Likewise, probable cause cannot be established because a 
person fails to cooperate with officials. "[T]here are several 
innocent explanations for a lack of forthrightness with law 
enforcement officers." Mova v. U.S., 761 F.2d at 325. 
Although a trained officer may have a "sixth sense" or 
suspicions because of a person's responses "i.e., defendant's 
incomprehensible disavowal of empathy for the feelings of a 
missing five-year old's parents" (Br.App. 31), to validate a 
search on such a basis would be tantamount to giving law enforce-
ment unbridled discretion in conducting warrantless searches. The 
constitution prohibits such searches and requires officers to 
present reasons for a search to a neutral, objective magistrate 
for the issuance of a warrant. As an exception to the warrant 
requirement, before an officer may conduct a search, he must 
articulate objective facts giving rise to probable cause and 
exigent circumstances. "Articulable probable cause" provides a 
principled limitation on an officer's discretion and power. Even 
with hindsight, officers in this action were unable to articulate 
circumstances giving rise to probable cause. The state must be 
required to forego the evidence illegally seized. 
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C. THE STATE HAS MISCONSTRUED THE PREMISE UNDERLYING THE 
EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE. 
The state places too much emphasis on State v. Mitchell, 347 
N.E.2d 607 (N.Y.App. 1976). Notwithstanding the Mitchell court's 
prohibition against warrantless searches based on inexplicable 
facts, the court validated the search of defendant's hotel room 
as the "last room to be searched on the 6th floor," where the 
victim's half-eaten sandwich was found and she was last seen 
cleaning. Id. at 608. 
The Mitchell court "hastened to admonish" use of this very 
limited privilege, since police activity must "be grounded in 
empirical facts rather than subjective feelings." Id. at 609-10. 
Police must have a valid reason for believing an emergency exists 
in the area to be searched. Id.; State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 
921 (Utah App. 1995) (search based on exigent circumstances to 
ascertain occupant's safety must cease once safety is deter-
mined) . Officers' beliefs grounded in subjective feelings and 
hunches are insufficient to warrant a search under the doctrine. 
In this case, Eyre, who conducted the warrantless search, 
could not base his feelings on anything relating to the immediate 
situation. He admitted as much: "Maybe some of that was a concern 
for a little girl who was missing. I have a young girl who is of 
almost the same age, and the entire situation was a pretty tense 
situation." (R. 637.) He could not articulate empirical facts 
connecting the area to be searched to an emergency. In fact, even 
when Eyre was on the balcony with Yoder, he did not believe 
Shalee "could be in or around" the area, but due to a 
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"premonition," he felt it would be "appropriate" to check the 
closet. (R. 337; 362-64; 623-24.) 
In addition, under the "emergency aid" and "community 
caretaker" doctrines, officers are not permitted to explore the 
area as Eyre did in this case. They enter only for the purpose 
of administering immediate aid. Thus, where entry of a hotel 
room was undertaken for the purpose of aiding a person the police 
were told had suffered a gunshot wound, but the room was found 
unoccupied, it was illegal for the officer then to open a suit-
case. See U.S. v. Godenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (8th Cir. 
1972); Bass v. State, 732 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) 
(entry of a dwelling to look for missing person, by exceeding the 
permissible scope of a search for appellant's body or signs of 
foul play, officer rendered an initially good search bad). The 
emergency aid doctrine does not justify the search in this case. 
D. SHALEE'S TESTIMONY AND THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH ARE 
INSEPARABLY LINKED. 
The state does not dispute that if this Court determines the 
search was conducted in violation of the fourth amendment, 
evidence obtained in connection therewith lacks sufficient 
attenuation to purge the taint of the illegal conduct. (See 
Br.App. 39.) However, the state argues the exclusionary rule 
should not be applied to the testimony of a live witness, i.e. 
Shalee, and has cited to U.S. v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 277 
(1978), which concerns suppression of the testimony of a third-
party bystander as opposed to a witness actually discovered 
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during the illegal search. Id. 
The state has identified a number of Ceccolini factors 
"relevant to determining whether a live witness's testimony 
should be suppressed." (Br.App. 41.) On the one hand, the 
Ceccolini factors are inapplicable to this case. Central to 
their application is the proposition that the witness is likely 
to be discovered by legal means. "Witnesses are not like guns or 
documents which remain hidden from view until one turns over a 
sofa or opens a filing cabinet"; they come forward and offer 
evidence entirely of their own volition. Id. at 276. The 
greater the "likelihood" that they otherwise will come forward, 
the more applicable the Ceccolini factors. 
Thus, if "the search was conducted by the police for the 
specific purpose of discovering [the] potential witnesses" the 
logic of Ceccolini does not apply and the analysis is different. 
Id. at 276 n.4. Indeed, the witness is like a gun or document, 
where the witness is the product of the illegal search. In that 
instance, the taint cannot be dissipated under the rationale of 
Ceccolini. "[W]e cannot be unmindful of the principles estab-
lished by long precedent which have sought to preserve the 
sanctity of the home and the right of privacy of the individual 
merely because the evidence has changed from inanimate to animate 
form." People v. Albea, 118 N.E.2d 277, 279 (111. 1954) (search 
resulted in discovery and seizure of human being who is later 
used as material witness in prosecution; court declines to adopt 
rule separate from that concerning illegal seizure of papers and 
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other property); State v. Rogers, 198 N.E.2d 796 (Ohio 1963); 
Garza v. State, 771 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. App. 1989) . 
On the other hand, the differences in Ceccolini and this 
case emphasize the difference in outcome when the factors are 
applied. The state has identified the first and second factors 
as "(1) the degree of free will exercised by the witness, [and] 
(2) whether illegally seized evidence was used in questioning the 
witness." (Br.App. 41-43.) With respect to the first factor, 
the state suggests that the court will take into consideration 
whether the witness will testify of her own free will without 
inducement from police. (Br.App. 42.) The Ceccolini Court was 
concerned with whether the witness would be discovered by legal 
means, concomitantly reducing the incentive to conduct an illegal 
search to discover the witness. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276. The 
first and second factors cannot be met in this case where the 
incentive did not reduce the use of illegal conduct. The officers 
were intent on "search[ing] everything, everywhere" (R. 518) "to 
verify that this little girl wasn't there." (R. 592.) In 
addition, Shalee was directly and physically discovered as a 
result of the illegal conduct, and the prosecutor directly used 
her and solicited testimony from her during evidentiary hearings. 
The state identified "proximity" as the fourth factor in 
Ceccolini. (Br.App. 43.) In that case, "substantial periods of 
time elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the 
initial contact with the witness." Id. at 279. In this case, the 
officers7 illegal search and contact with Shalee occurred 
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simultaneously. This case differs markedly from Ceccolini. 
Shalee's testimony is directly linked to the illegal search and 
officers who conducted the search in an effort to find Shalee. 
Finally, contrary to the state's assertion concerning the 
third factor, applying the exclusionary rule in this case will 
have a powerful, deterring effect on the behavior of officers. 
From the beginning, this case has been highly publicized. If this 
Court reverses the trial court's order on the motion to suppress, 
the reversal will alert law enforcement to take care when 
gathering evidence to ensure its admissibility in proceedings. 
If the trial court's ruling is affirmed, searches made 
without probable cause or valid consent will be encouraged, 
especially in those cases where police are acting on a hunch and 
believe they will obtain probable cause at some later point in 
the investigation independent of the unlawful act. A review of 
the Ceccolini factors compels the determination that all evidence 
obtained as a result of the illegal search in this case must be 
suppressed, including live testimony. 
POINT II. THE FACTS SUPPORT THAT IDLE KNEW HIS REMARKS TO 
YODER WOULD ELICIT INCRIMINATING RESPONSES. 
The state acknowledges that statements received through 
interrogation, which may constitute words on the part of the 
police eliciting an incriminating response from the suspect, must 
be preceded by Miranda warnings.9 In this case, Officer Robert 
9
 In the "Statement of the Facts," the state incorrectly asserts 
that Miranda warnings were given to Yoder (Br.App. 11) while he was 
detained in his apartment for 45 minutes before being transported to 
(continued...) 
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Idle's ("Idle") statements to Yoder and his incriminating 
responses were recorded. Thus, the Court does not have to rely 
on the memories of the witnesses, their descriptions of the mood, 
or the state's mischaracterization of the incident. 
While the state asserts Yoder talked almost constantly, 
making rambling statements, the transcript of the conversation 
defies that description. (Addendum C to Brief of Appellant.) 
Idle clearly was engaging Yoder in conversation. In fact, Idle 
initiated that portion of the conversation concerning the 
evening's events. 
The following is a taped conversation of suspect Michael 
Yoder on case 93-48983. 
Yoder: (inaudible) I've spent 25 or 3 0 years staying 
drunk trying to (inaudible) I have never hurt anybody in my 
whole life, and I don't mind telling you (inaudible). 
Idle: (inaudible). 
Yoder: It would sure make me feel better. (inaudible) 
when I started feeling bad, probably kept alot of other 
things from feeling bad. By the way I have a little 9 year 
old little girl. 
Idle: Do ya? I sure would hate to see something like 
this happen to her. 
(Id.) In addition, contrary to the state's claim (Br.App. 46), 
Idle engaged back and forth in conversation with Yoder. (See 
Addendum C to Brief of Appellant.) 
The state also claims "Idle had no reason to know defendant 
was peculiarly susceptible to appeals to his conscience regarding 
little girls" (Br.App. 47), and had "no reason to know" Yoder 
y
 (. . .continued) 
jail. The record fails to support that assertion. Lynn Hanson testified 
that he believed Vince Garcia or Detective Cowley "informed" him that 
Yoder "had invoked" Miranda. (R. 453-54, 646.) Although Garcia testified, 
he did not state that he had given the warnings to Yoder. Cowley did not 
testify. Thus, no evidence exists to support Hanson's belief. 
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"was unusually disoriented or upset" at the time of his arrest. 
Yet the state admits Yoder made statements of remorse and concern 
regarding Shalee immediately after she was discovered (Br.App. 
44, n. 14), and Idle observed earlier that Yoder was "depressed, 
despondent, very concerned about his future." (Br.App. 47.) 
Thus, Idle knew by engaging Yoder in conversation he may secure 
incriminating remarks. 
Finally, contrary to the state's assertion, Idle's remarks 
were more than mere "offhand remarks" and "expressions of agree-
ment." They were directed at Yoder. Idle followed responsive 
expressions with a statement of judgment concerning the 
situation. Further, the fact that Idle immediately engaged a 
tape recorder on the drive to the jail (Br.App. 46) supports the 
determination that Idle anticipated capturing incriminating 
statements on tape in violation of Yoder's constitutional rights. 
POINT III. THE RECORD DEFIES THE STATED ASSERTION THAT THE 
ALIENISTS UNANIMOUSLY REFUSED TO FIND YODER MENTALLY ILL. 
With respect to the trial court's determination that Yoder 
is not mentally ill, the state recognized that Dr. Nancy Cohn 
found Yoder "met the diagnostic criteria for paraphilia (sexual 
deviance), major depression and possibly even panic disorder." 
(Br.App. 50; Cohn Report at 2, 6.) The state does not dispute 
that Cohn also found Yoder suffers from chronic nervousness, 
anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, has a history of 
alcohol dependence, is able to control depression with 
medication, and would benefit from a "multi-layered program," or 
if sentenced to prison, "a facility where such services are 
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provided." (Cohn Report at 2.) Cohn clearly was prescribing 
services necessary to treat mental illness. 
Likewise, the state does not dispute that Dr. Eric Nielsen 
specifically answered in the affirmative that "this man suffer [s] 
from a mental illness." (Nielsen Report at 1.) He found Yoder 
suffers from major depression and a long history of alcohol and 
drug abuse. (Nielsen Report at 1.) Yet Nielsen concluded Yoder 
did not meet the criteria for guilty and mentally ill "as 
specified in Section 76-2-305(4)." (Id. at 2.) 
Even the trial court determined Yoder suffers from mental 
illness, including major depression, a mood disorder, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and a history of substance abuse, that 
Yoder7s conditions improved with institutional care and 
medication, and the State Hospital is appropriate for treatment 
of those conditions. (R. 194-96; 200; 742-43.) However, the 
trial court incorrectly ruled that because counseling and 
treatment were available to Yoder at the Utah State Prison, Yoder 
failed to qualify for the status of mentally ill. (Id.) The 
trial court misapplied the law. 
In its brief, the state also incorrectly applied sentencing 
criteria to support a mental illness finding. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions both examiners plainly 
recognized that commitment was not required in this case: 
(a) defendant was not presently or actively suicidal; (b) 
defendant was capable of working and had done so in the 
past, though he would need a good deal of support; (c) 
although "the State Hospital is clearly capable of treating 
[defendant's] depression and providing some treatment for 
his substance abuse problems[, t]he State Hospital, however 
does not have a treatment program for child sex abusers"; 
defendant was a candidate for sex offender and substance 
abuse treatment, which "may be provided while in custody, or 
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in an outpatient setting should the defendant be released." 
(Br.App. 50-51 (cites omitted).) Both the state and the trial 
court looked to criteria for sentencing a defendant who "is 
currently mentally ill,u Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-104 (3) (Supp. 
1996) (emphasis added), to assert Yoder is not mentally i l l . 
Section 77-16a-104 (3) provides the methods for imposing 
sentencing after the court finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that the defendant is mentally ill, while Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
305(4) (1995) defines mental illness. See State v. Murphy, 872 
P.2d 480, 483 (Utah App. 1994) (recognizing Section 76-2-305(4) 
contains the definition for mental illness, while Section 77-16a-
104's predecessor concerns sentencing). The trial court 
incorrectly applied the sentencing factors to determine the 
underlying question of mental illness. 
Because the overwhelming evidence supports a finding of 
mentally ill as recognized by the trial court (R. 194-96; 200; 
742-43), the trial court's ruling should be vacated and remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with the law. The trial court 
already has recommended that Yoder "receive early intervention 
and treatment in the sexual offenders program and the program for 
chronic substance abuse while at the Utah State Prison." (R. 
204.) Such a recommendation carries little force. By qualifying 
Yoder as mentally ill the trial court can take measures to ensure 
Yoder receives treatment and care. The trial court's failure to 
correctly apply the law deprives Yoder of necessary treatment. 
POINT IV. THE STATE CONCEDES CERTAIN FACTORS DEFINING THE 
OFFENSE WERE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING THE HARSHEST SENTENCE. 
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The state concedes certain facts considered by the trial 
court in imposing the harshest sentence in this matter are 
inherent in the offenses of kidnapping and sexual abuse of a 
child. (Br.App. 55.) In addition, those factors in part were 
set forth in the Information as the charged offense (R. 10-12) 
making them the basis for the conviction and elements of the 
offense. Thus, it was improper for the trial court also to con-
sider the factors as aggravating circumstances during sentencing. 
See State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 559-60 (Utah 1987) . 
In an effort to inflame this Court, the state improperly 
suggests that the trial court considered "other uncharged" 
conduct in determining Yoder had a contributing criminal history 
and in imposing the harshest sentence against Yoder. (Br.App. 
56.) To the extent that is true, Yoder7s right to due process 
under art. I, sec. 7 of the Utah Constitution has been violated. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled fundamental fairness requires 
that procedures in the sentencing phase be designed to ensure the 
decision-making process is based on accurate information. State 
v. Lioskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980); State v. Casarez, 656 
P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) ("Procedural fairness is as 
obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as at a guilt 
phase"); see also Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 
735 (Utah 1991).10 Reliance on unproved charges undermines the 
10
 Although the state agreed in the trial court proceedings that the 
offenses at issue comprised an isolated incident in mitigation of the 
sentence, the state now rejects that position. (Compare R. 740 ("We do 
agree that this was a single incident") to Br.App. 56.) The state 
asserts that the misdemeanor lewdness conviction identified in the 
(continued...) 
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accuracy of the process. A defendant who is punished based on 
unproven conduct suffers unfair prejudice and a violation of due 
process. See State v. Womack, 319 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. 1982); 
People v. Harvey, 159 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Cal. 1979); People v. 
Griffin, 166 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1960). 
The trial court's improper consideration of certain aggra-
vating circumstances in sentencing coupled with its willingness 
to recommend treatment and its determination that Yoder is a good 
candidate for a treatment program, compels the determination that 
at a minimum this case should be remanded for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Yoder respectfully requests the following: (1) the entry of 
an order reversing the trial court's ruling on the motion to 
suppress the evidence illegally obtained, including statements 
obtained by police from Yoder in violation of his rights under 
the fourth and fifth amendments to the federal constitution and 
Shalee's testimony, or in the alternative, (2) an order remanding 
the case for resentencing as requested herein. 
SUBMITTED t h i s iSiJL day of ILtX+fah. , 1996 . 
^/udalUL 
LINDA M. JONES 
LISA J . REMAL 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
10(...continued) 
presentence report supports the trial court's determination that Yoder 
had a "contributing prior history." (Id.) Significantly, that offense 
was incorrectly characterized in the presentence report as an offense 
involving an adult and a child. (Presentence Report at 19.) The offense 
involved only an adult. (See R. at 730; see also R. 719-20 for additional 
corrections to the presentence report.) 
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